GwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwD T h e G R E E N Y w o r l d D o m i n a t i o n T a s k F o r c e , I n c o r p o r a t e d Presents: __ __ 999999999 666 _____ ____ _| |__| |_ 9999 9999 666 // | \ |_ __ _| 999 999 666 || ____ | || | | | | | 9999 9999 6666666666 || || \ / | || | _| |__| |_ 9999999999 6666 6666 \\___// \/\/ |____/ |_ __ _| 999 666 666 |__| |__| 999 6666 6666 999 666666666 "A Look at Hardin's Attack on Contemporary Theories of Color" by Otis ----- GwD: The American Dream with a Twist -- of Lime ***** Issue #96 ----- ----- release date: 01-03-01 ***** ISSN 1523-1585 ----- C.L. Hardin attacks several current theories of color in "Color and Illusion" that attempt to explain color in physical terms, including a purely physical account that depends on wavelength to determine color, promulgated by Armstrong, a dispositionalist account that utilizes the concepts of "normal observer" and "standard conditions," and an account that uses spectral reflectances to arrive at an explanation of color phenomenon. I will examine each in turn, though I have little to say about Hardin's treatment of the wavelength theory of color. I. Hardin's Attack on the Wavelength Theory of Color The wavelength theory of color, promulgated by Armstrong, appears to have been supplanted by the more sophisticated reflectivist theory of Averill and Hilbert. Hardin's arguments against this theory are devastating, given what we now know about the connection between wavelengths and actual visual appearance. To attack this theory, which appears antiquated, seems to be much like beating a dead horse, if I might be appropriate this apropos proverb; consequently, I find this section of "Color and Illusion" to be of little interest. II. Hardin's Problem with Dispositionalism After discoursing on the seemingly fatal flaws of Armstrong's physicalist reduction of color to wavelengths, Hardin next considers dispositionalism as endorsed by J.J.C. Smart and David Lewis. Hardin does not appear to be at odds with the eponymous idea of dispositionalism, namely that objects possess dispositions to appear as certain colors, as his concentration in this portion of the essay is directed elsewhere. However, this idea is not the terminal point of the dispositionalist account, and it is the concluding concept that Hardin finds sufficiently problematic for investigation, if not utterly erroneous. These dispositions that produce color "cause us to be in particular perceptual states under particular circumstances," (1) where "particular circumstances" are typically assumed to be constituted of a "normal observer" in "standard conditions." Hardin undermines these latter components of the dispositionalist account insofar as they cannot be upheld under the scrutiny of philosophical observation. Hardin produces an elaborate defense of this assault on the basis of the phenomenon of metamerism and the problem of actually determining a "normal observer" and "standard" set of viewing conditions. His main contention rests on the inability to justify a choice of these latter elements, which is required given that a viable set does not emerge from experience without difficulty and without alternative. Before doing so, however, Hardin does maintain that a "normal observer" and "standard" set of viewing conditions can be justifiably produced for pragmatic purposes in color science. Why, then, cannot the same be done outside the realm of colorimetry, where it then appears to be valid? Why must a "set of conditions for determining the 'true' or 'real' colors of objects...[not be] construed non- pragmatically and in more than a rough-and-ready sense" (2)? If such a method has practical application, though a single set of viewing conditions does not enter into the picture, what is the basis for rejecting it? Many philosophical claims that are found to be practically useful are accepted without a complete verification of their truthfulness, which may not even be possible; in fact, both Peirce and James promoted a theory of truth that depended essentially on pragmatism. Thus, pragmatic concerns should not be ruled out outright in determining the validity of a concept. Furthermore, why must a single set of viewing conditions that can be applied universally be the only possibility for the dispositionalists? Though it is clear that this application would represent a greater achievement than to relegate color to quasi-relativism, it is not at all clear whether or not this is even possible. At this point, Hardin seems to contradict his own philosophical strategy throughout the article, that of questioning the foundation of beliefs. While demanding a justification for a choice of "normal observer" and "standard conditions," he has no qualms about rejecting the set of viewing conditions employed by colorimetry, though valid and useful by his own admission, to meet the needs of the dispositionalist without justification of his own. Perhaps making a claim of this sort would be acceptable given a claim's immediate obviousness, but that quality seems highly doubtful in this case. The entirety of his following argument against dispositionalism rests on the inadequacy of the colorimetric methodology for dispositionalism, but an account as to the reason for labeling the methodology as inadequate is never provided. Thus, his attack against dispositionalism can be redirected as an attack against his own position. His criticisms regarding the search for a "normal observer" and "standard conditions" are compelling and plentiful, though they possess force only if his assumption concerning the inability of colorimetry to provide general sets of viewing conditions for dispositionalism is correct. III. Hardin's Criticism of the Spectral Reflectance Theory of Color The definition of color as a disjunction of the spectral reflectances that the surfaces of objects possess is a physicalist approach updated from the more primitive Armstrong approach and has been put forth by Edward W. Averill and D. Hilbert. Hardin admits the merits of this way of viewing the problem of color, though he recognizes "two tasks that remain to be carried out by the reflectivist before he can claim that his is an adequate theory of color" (3). Hardin maintains that the first component of this "adequacy" is that the theory must "cover chromatic physical phenomena that do not depend upon the reflection of light" (4). The obvious question, considering the thrust of my attack on Hardin, is this: why must an adequate theory of color cover sources of color not dependent on light? What special authority does Hardin possess that enables him to determine what a theory of color needs to have to be adequate? To use his words, "by virtue of what principle does one" (5) say what a theory of color does or does not need? Thus, according to some criteria, the reflectivist theory is adequate, while according to other criteria, it is not. Who is to choose between the two criteria? Hardin's second objection appears preposterous on the face of it, though perhaps this apparent absurdity is the result of a naive reading: "Surely he [the reflectivist] has not [given an adequate theory of color] until he has told us about red, and green, and yellow, and blue" (6). But has this aim not already been achieved by accepting colors as being the disjunction of different spectral reflectances of objects that are perceptually identical? When one asks the reflectivist what "red" means, he will answer that it is the color one sees when viewing an object with spectral reflectance s1, s2, etc., where sx is a spectral reflectance that perceptually corresponds to the color of red. If one then inquires what "spectral reflectance" means, a definition could be provided, satisfying the original definition by not being indefinable and consequently having suitable explanatory capacity. At first glance, the original definition appears circular, but I do not think it is. If someone inquires further and asks for an illustration of red, one of the objects that has one of the spectral reflectances that compromises the disjunction that is red can be shown him. In this way, a link between the definition and empirical evidence can be established and a circular, uninformative definition can be avoided. In what other sense does the reflectivist need to "[tell] us about red, and green, and yellow, and blue"(7)? The first objection that I wish to make here is one that I have insisted on throughout this work, namely that of Hardin's lack of justification. Who is C.L. Hardin to determine when an adequate theory of color is reached? To proceed with this line of attack further seems trivial, given its fuller explication in its previous incarnations in this document. A further objection is the conclusion drawn from the above illustration of the definitive capacity of the reflectivist theory: does not the reflectivist theory define color? When one asks what a car is, another could respond by saying that a car is a vehicle comprised of such-and-such parts; further inquiry into the nature of these components can be satisfied with their own appropriate definitions that can in turn be defined, presumably as far as the minutest particles of the physical world revealed by physics. Is this not an adequate definition for "car" and parallel in structure to the definition provided for "red" under the reflectivist theory? If the answer to this query is yes, then Hardin's second objection to the current reflectivist account must be discounted. IV. Concluding Remarks Hardin's proposal for an adequate theory of color, though not explicitly drawn out, occurs in the final pages of "Color and Illusion:" Redness, greenness, yellowness, and blueness...depend upon quite a few more variables than just their wavelength profile...the reflectivist theory, like the wavelength theory, suffers from an irremediable underdetermination: too many of the mechanisms essential to the production of the colors that we see lie within the bodies of the perceivers. (8) To begin with, Hardin appears already to have gotten at the nature of color, given the declaration made in the second half of the above statement: how does he know that whatever mechanisms that aid in the production of colors are essential to the production of color? It seems that the only way to determine if mechanisms that "lie within the bodies of the perceivers" are essential to the production of colors is to see if color remains after the removal of these faculties. The obvious answer seems to be: well, close your eyes, and color fades. But though you may no longer see color, it may in fact continue to exist and consequently is not essentially bound to your visual capabilities. Thus, even if all of humanity were to lose their visual capabilities, we would be at a loss to know if color still existed or not, a determination which would further require a definition of existence. By saying this, Hardin presumes to have already determined the truth of the matter, which is in fact far from determined. In reference to the first half of the above quotation, how can one ever determine when all the variables that enter into our perception of color have been located? Even though a large number of variables have been discovered to be at work in color perception, their existence does not rule out the existence of other, undiscovered variables; nothing, it would seem, could do such a thing. Furthermore, the reflectivist theory makes no claims as to being perfect, only to being adequate. Hardin seems to suggest that the only theory of color that he can countenance is one that takes into account the totality of the phenomenal experience of seeing color, an account that may in fact be impossible. Though the remarkable advances in science would seem to cut against this claim, it remains a possibility that some of the components of the visual process may not be ultimately explainable and end in a brute fact. Thus, can we not have a theory of color until we have achieved a finished science of the visual process? Again, who is to determine whether we can or not, and by virtue of what principle? Hardin's concluding comments suggest that color may in fact be an illusion, a possibility that this reader is able to countenance. Then again, a possibility it must remain in the absence of undeniable evidence in support of it. As to Hardin's position within the continuing realism/anti-realism debate, he appears in the concluding paragraph of "Color and Illusion" to want to try and hold both a realist and an anti-realist view of color. The realist perspective manifests when Hardin alleges that the experience of color "depends essentially upon processes that take place within the confines of the head... [and] the stuffings of the head are, after all, material, and the whole process of color perception is physical, determinate, and lawlike from beginning to end" (9). Then, however, what Hardin wants to say acquires an anti-realist dimension, when he claims that "physical objects need not have colors of their own" and reduces color sensation to illusion, which, given the non-being of illusion, is anti-realist. ----- -=[Footnotes]=- 1. Hardin, C. L. "Color and Illusion." Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings. Ed. Steven D. Hales. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1999. 310. 2. Ibid. 310. 3. Ibid. 314. 4. Ibid. 314. 5. Ibid. 307. 6. Ibid. 314. 7. Ibid. 314. 8. Ibid. 315. 9. Ibid. 315. ----------------------------------------------------------- GwDweb: http://www.GREENY.org/ GwD Publications: http://gwd.mit.edu/ ftp://ftp.GREENY.org/gwd/ GwD BBSes: C.H.A.O.S. - http://chaos.GREENY.org/ Snake's Den - http://www.snakeden.org/ E-Mail: gwd@GREENY.org * GwD, Inc. - P.O. Box 16038 - Lubbock, Texas 79490 * -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "The pile of shit has a thousand eyes." - Corey Feldman's character in _Stand By Me_ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -+- F Y M -+- GR33NY LIK3S mash3d p0tat03s MORE THAN FIVE YEARS of ABSOLUTE CRAP! /---------------\ copyright (c) MM Otis/GwD Publications :LICK MY ASSHOLE: copyright (c) MM GwD, Inc. : GwD : All rights reserved \---------------/ GwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwD96